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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in firm selection processes in 
the Slovenian manufacturing sector in the 1994-2003 period by assessing the impact of the entry and 
presence of foreign firms on a domestic firm’s probability of exiting. The results confirm that not only 
do foreign entrants tend to be above-average productive but they also find it easier to exit (particularly 
those entering in the form of acquisitions). Further, the least efficient firms are found to experience a 
drop in their survival probability upon a foreign firm’s entry. In addition, a foreign firm’s entry seems 
to stimulate the selection process not only within the industry but also through backward linkages in 
the upstream supplying industries. Regarding the productivity spillover effects from foreign to local 
firms the results suggest that they mostly operate through vertical linkages rather than within the same 
industry.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
 
This paper examines the role of inward FDI in firm selection processes in a small transition country of 
Slovenia. It adopts the firm dynamics framework that allows the testing of these effects directly 
through the influence on the crowding out of local firms by assessing the impact of the entry and 
presence of foreign firms on a domestic firm’s probability of exiting. By applying heteroscedastic 
pooled probit model and random effects probit estimator and testing for the robustness of the results 
by controlling for the possible endogeneity of the foreign ownership variable and endogeneity that is 
caused by unobserved firm-specific effects to the panel data of Slovenian manufacturing firms in the 
1994-2003 period the paper provides evidence that theoretically predicted channels through which 
inward FDI affects the firm dynamics in a host country (competition effect and productivity spillovers) 
prove to be in general significant.  
 
First, there is evidence of the direct impact of foreign firms on a change in the population of Slovenian 
manufacturing firms. Not only do foreign entrants tend to be above-average productive but they also 
find it easier to exit (particularly those entering in the form of acquisitions), confirming that on 
average they are more mobile than their domestic counterparts.  
 
Second, the entry of foreign firms stimulates the selection process and reallocation of resources among 
firms within the same industry based on their productive efficiency. The firm selection process is, 
namely, characterised by the least efficient firms experiencing a drop in their survival probability upon 
a foreign firm’s entry. On the other hand, more efficient and more skill-intensive firms do not 
experience any pronounced ‘static’ crowding out with respect to the increased probability to exit. In 
addition, a foreign firm’s entry seems to stimulate the selection process not only within the industry 
but also through backward linkages in the upstream supplying industries as indicated by less skill-
intensive firms’ increased probability of exiting when the concentration of foreign firm activity in 
backwardly-linked industries rises. 
 
 Third, regarding the productivity spillover effects from foreign to local firms the results suggest that 
they mostly operate through vertical linkages rather than within the same industry. The impact of 
foreign firms’ activity on the survival probability through forward linkages with local customers is the 
most pronounced. In general, it seems that not all firms are equally able to benefit from a foreign 
firm’s presence and that absorptive capacity plays an important role. 
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Introduction 
 
The paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of the role of incoming foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the firm selection process within domestic industries in a small transition country of Slovenia. 
Several recent empirical studies provide evidence that within-industry reallocations from less to more 
productive firms and the exit/entry process contribute significantly to average productivity growth and 
constitute an important mode of industrial restructuring (see Olley and Pakes (1996), Roberts and 
Tybout (1996), Pavcnik (2002), Tybout (2001)).  At the same time, it is widely recognised that 
investment liberalisation is one of the most important triggers of the industrial restructuring process 
driven by intra- and inter-industry firm selection processes. The paper adopts  the firm dynamics 
framework and assesses the impact of the entry and presence of foreign firms on a domestic firm’s 
probability of exiting based on a panel of Slovenian manufacturing firms in the last decade. 
 
As indicated in the theoretical literature (reviewed in, for example, Caves (1996), Blomström and 
Kokko (1997, 1998)), there are two main opposing effects through which inward FDI can affect a 
domestic firm’s survival and performance: competition effect and productivity spillover effects. The 
entry of a foreign firm (either through exports or FDI) namely disturbs the existing equilibrium in the 
host country and increases the intensity of competition. The competition also intensifies if the foreign 
firm was exporting prior to establishing local production in the host-country market since, by avoiding 
export costs, the foreign firm’s competitive position is improved. The competition effect of inward 
FDI (a foreign firm’s entry/presence) has clear implications for the exit and growth of domestic firms. 
By increasing competition in the host country, a foreign firm’s entry and presence may lead to the 
crowding out of local firms. The entry of a foreign firm with lower marginal costs draws demand away 
from domestic firms as the foreign firm has an incentive to increase production relative to its domestic 
competitors. Domestic firms are then forced to cut production and the least productive ones even to 
exit the market. As emphasised by Görg and Strobl (2003), regardless of the cost structure the 
increased production of foreign rivals will generally lead to a reduction of the output price which will 
shrink the price-cost margin and increase the probability of the exit of domestic firms and reduce the 
prospects for their future growth. However, some local rivals might react to this intensified 
competition by investing in product and/or process upgrading or by merging. The competition effect 
may also operate in the factor markets, whereby foreign firms may crowd out domestic rivals by 
increasing factor prices in the economy. Moreover, a selection effect might also operate through 
vertical linkages when the degree of linkages might be weaker in the case of MNEs compared to 
domestic firms, leading to a decrease in demand for intermediate products. As pointed out by 
Smarzynska (2004) and Saggi (2002), MNEs’ entry to downstream sectors might lower the demand 
for domestically produced intermediates, particularly when it forces less productive domestic 
producers in this industry to exit. The demand for domestically produced intermediates might decrease 
either because they use inputs more efficiently or they rely more on imported intermediates (see 
Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1991). In addition, some local suppliers might not be able to achieve 
the higher product standards or delivery conditions demanded by foreign firms.  
 
On the other hand, foreign firms’ activity in the host country may confer positive productivity 
spillovers on domestic firms.
1 Since productivity is one of the key determinants of whether or not a 
firm exits and of the prospects of its growth, through spillover effects FDI also indirectly positively 
affects the domestic firm’s survival and its growth performance An increase in productivity through 
technological spillovers will, ceteris paribus, reduce a domestic firm’s average production costs which 
                                                 
1 These externalities may appear since ‘technology’ is to some extent a public good, there is a belief that foreign 
firms may not be able to fully internalise their technological advantages and therefore their presence would lead 
to various types of ‘productivity spillovers’ to domestic firms.    4
in turn expands its price-cost margin. Thus, in the case of positive technological spillovers we can 
expect a greater probability of survival. However, several studies assert that local firms must have an 
ability to learn and take advantage of the technology employed in multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
This so-called absorptive capacity is often related to the skill intensity and learning experiences of the 
firm. A domestically-owned firm might benefit from the presence of foreign firms through several 
potential channels: (i) through the backward and forward linkages (customer-supplier links) between 
MNEs and domestic firms; (ii) MNEs’ training of local employees; (iii) demonstration effects; and (iv) 
competition from MNEs. Productivity spillovers may thus occur within the same industry (intra-
industry spillovers), in vertically – upstream and downstream – related industries (inter-industry 
spillovers), or as a result of agglomeration (see Blomström and Kokko, (1997, 1998)).  
 
The nature of these effects and the relative importance of the channels depend on a number of FDI 
characteristics. As pointed out by Kosová (2004) to distinguish and estimate both effects separately 
two different measures of foreign firm entry and presence should be included in an empirical model’s 
specification. While there is a substantial body of empirical literature on spillover effects, evidence of 
the importance and mechanisms of competition effects is relatively rare. Moreover, most studies test 
the presence of productivity spillovers by estimating the production function on the level of firms or 
plants without controlling for the fact that FDI might have a significant impact on the exit of domestic 
firms. Several authors argue that FDI’s impacts and, in particular, the competition/selection effect are 
better analysed from the perspectives of industry and firm dynamics. Accordingly, that is the 
framework I have chosen for the empirical analysis. More specifically, I estimate a firm exit model 
using firm-level data for the Slovenian manufacturing sector in the 1994-2003 period. The firm 
dynamics framework allows the assessing of the competition effect and in particular the role of inward 
FDI in the industry selection process more directly through its impact on the crowding out of local 
firms (increased probability of exiting). At the same time, this framework also allows me to indirectly 
test for productivity spillover effects since productivity is one of the main determinants of a firm’s 
survival.  
 
Despite the relatively numerous empirical studies on a firm’s survival and growth, empirical evidence 
of the impacts of inward FDI or even of foreign competition generally on the growth and survival of 
local firms is very limited. The rare exceptions are studies by Görg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland, De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) for Belgium, and Kosová (2004) for the Czech Republic. Using plant-
level data for the Irish manufacturing sector in the 1973-1996 period and employing a Cox 
proportional hazard model, Görg and Strobl (2003) find that the presence of multinationals has a 
positive effect on the survival of Irish plants but this effect is only significant for plants that operate in 
high-tech sectors. Regarding foreign-owned plants, they provide evidence that foreign plants have 
higher hazards of exiting than indigenous plants and that the presence of multinationals has a negative 
effect on the survival of other foreign-owned plants in low-tech sectors. On the contrary, De Backer 
and Sleuwaegen (2003) find evidence that inward FDI increases domestic exits by separately 
estimating exit and entry functions for Belgian manufacturing data. The crowding-out effect is 
stronger in the case of FDI than in the case of imports. Moreover, they find that increased foreign 
competition both through increased imports and inward FDI negatively affects the entry of domestic 
firms. However, the empirical results suggest that the importance of positive long-term structural 
effects measured by the relative number of foreign firms in related industries (defined as industries 
belonging to the same NACE-2 digit level) between foreign and domestic firms can moderate or even 
reverse crowding-out effects. Distinguishing between static and dynamic crowding-out effects of 
domestic firms by foreign ones and technological spillover effects in survival and growth models 
using 1994-2001 firm-level panel data for the Czech Republic, Kosová (2004) provides evidence that 
foreign expansion, measured by the foreign sales growth rate, has a positive effect on both the growth 
and survival of domestic firms. These results, together with the significantly higher exit rates of   5
domestic firms around the time of a foreign entry, suggest that crowding out, and thus the adjustment 
of domestic firms to FDI inflows, is merely a one-time static effect realised upon foreign entry. So 
there is a shakeout of domestic firms when foreign firms enter but, subsequent to this initial entry 
effect, domestic firms benefit from the expanding foreign industry.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up theoretical framework for the empirical 
model’s specification. In Section 3, the data and main descriptive statistics with respect to domestic- 
and foreign-owned firms are presented. Section 4 specifies an exit model to be applied to panel data 
for Slovenian manufacturing firms and defines the variables. Section 5 discusses the main econometric 
problems dealt with in the empirical analysis. Further, Section 6 presents the results and implications 
of the empirical estimations. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main findings of the 
empirical analysis. 
 
 
1.  Theoretical framework for the empirical model’s specification  
 
 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature often studies firm exits and growth together as an outcome 
of a single economic process of industrial evolution. Most recent studies adopt the framework of so-
called firm and industry dynamics models which focus on the selection process among heterogeneous 
firms within a particular industry that operates through the entry and exit process and emphasise the 
importance of firms’ learning process for the selection and evolution process within the industry. 
These models are thus also known as ‘learning models’ as the entrant typically does not know its own 
cost structure (efficiency), but it is discovered through the processes of passive (Jovanovic, 1982) or 
active learning (Erikson and Pakes, 1995) from actual market experience subsequent to entry. These 
theories can explain some of the empirical regularities that appear to be crucial for understanding the 
process of firm exits and growth (see Sutton, 1997). In particular, the size-age-growth relationship: 
larger firms tend to have lower growth rates but are more likely to survive. Further, for any given size 
of firm the proportional growth rate is smaller the older the firm is yet its probability of survival is 
greater.  
 
Recently, models of industry dynamics with heterogeneous firms have been integrated into general 
equilibrium trade models by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003). The 
models focus on the effects of increased foreign competition through the lowering of trade barriers on 
evolution processes within industries. While they are similar in their main prediction  that trade 
liberalisation forces the least efficient firms to contract or exit while promoting the growth and success 
of more efficient ones, they differ with respect to channels and motivations. The models of firm and 
industry dynamics that also account for foreign competition are almost exclusively based on trade and 
do not consider the FDI entry mode.  
 
I chose a general dynamic model of heterogeneous firm behaviour that mostly follows Olley and 
Pakes’ (1996) model and its empirical application in Bernard and Jensen (2002) as the framework for 
the empirical model’s specification. This framework is general enough to allow the testing of various 
predictions of FDI’s impacts on domestic firms’ survival in the Slovenian manufacturing sector in the 
1994-2003 period. 
 
The firm is assumed to maximise the expected discounted value of its future net cash flows. A single-
period net cash flow is equal to the current profit π t minus the cost of the current investment c(it), 
where it is the level of investments. Current profits are assumed to be a function of the set of the firm’s 
own state variables λt, factor prices τt, which are assumed to be common across firms and to evolve   6
according to an exogenous first-order Markov process, a vector of state variables γt that summarises 
the market structure of the domestic industry including the firm’s own prior investment history, and 
the set of a exogenous factors θt that reflects conditions outside the domestic industry (π t(λt, θt, τt, γt)). 
According to Olley and Pakes’ model, the firm’s own state variables λt include the age of the firm at, 
the firm’s capital stock kt, and an index of the firm’s efficiency ωt
2 (λt = (at, kt, ωt)). 
 
At the beginning of every period, an incumbent firm has the following decisions to make: 
  the first is to decide whether to exit or continue to operate. If it exits, it receives a liquidation 
value of φ. 
  provided a firm decides to continue, it chooses variable factors (labour) and a level of 
investments (it).
3 
 
The general Bellman value function for the dynamic programme of the firm that maximises the 
expected discounted value of its future net cash flows can then be written as: 
 
Vt(λt, θt, τt, γt)= max {φ, sup π t(λt, θt, τt, γt)– c(it) + βE[Vt+1(λt+1, θt+1, τt+1, γt+1)|Jt]}, (1) 
 
where πt(·) is the restricted current profit function, β is the firm’s discount factor, and Jt represents the 
information available at time t.  
 
The solution to this problem gives an exit rule and an investment demand function. Only if the 
ongoing value of the firm is greater than the liquidation value does the firm choose a non-negative 
value of investment. If the indicator function χt is defined to be 1 if the firm exits, then the exit rule 
and investment demand equation are specified, respectively, as: 
 
 
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧ <
=
, 0
), , , , ( 1
otherwise
d d if t t t t t t
t
γ τ θ λ
χ         ( 2 )  
and 
 
 i t = it(λt, θt, τt, γt) .           (3) 
 
 
The functions  t d (λt, θt, τt, γt) and it(λt, θt, τt, γt) are determined as part of Markov’s perfect Nash 
equilibrium and will depend on all parameters determining the equilibrium behaviour, including the 
market structure and the factor prices prevalent when these decisions are made.  
 
In the paper I focus only on the exit decision. I choose a probit model as the parametric specification 
of exit decision function (2) given by: 
 
) ( ) 1 Pr( β it it it X X dexit Φ = = ,          ( 4 )  
 
                                                 
2 The index of productivity, ω, is known to the firm and evolves over time according to an exogenous Markov 
process. The distribution of ωt conditional on all information known at t is determined by the family of 
distribution functions Fω = {F(·|ω), ω∈Ω}. 
3 The capital stock at the beginning of the next period is thus determined by kt+1=(1-δ)kt + it. 
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where dexitit is the dependent binomial variable, which takes the value of 1 in the year of a firm’s exit 
and 0 for all previous years and Xit=(λt, θt, τt, γt).  
2.  The data 
 
The firm’s exit function is estimated based on annual panel data on firms operating in the Slovenian 
manufacturing sector (NACE 15-37) in the 1994-2003 period
4. One of the advantages of this dataset is 
that, unlike in most studies on FDI that restrict the sample to larger firms, it covers the whole 
population of manufacturing firms as reporting is mandatory for all firms (business entities) registered 
in Slovenia. Originally, the dataset contained information on 9,711 firms operating between 1994 and 
2003 but firms with a zero number of employees and a negative value of equity were dropped from the 
sample which gives 7,652 firms in the final sample.  
 
The year of exit is defined according to the effective definition of market operations. The official year 
of the termination of operations as recorded in the Business Register is thus corrected if the firm 
stopped being active in the market already before the official year of termination. The bankruptcy 
process usually lasts for several years, and a firm terminates all of its regular operations a year or even 
more before the date of termination is officially recorded in the register, therefore in this case I define 
as the year of exit the last year of a firm’s effective operation defined by positive sales and 
employment according to annual accounting data. The data cover the ten-year period between 1994 
and 2003 but, as effective exits in 2003 and effective entries in 1994 cannot be identified, the effective 
sample on which the empirical estimations are performed is restricted to the 1995-2002 period. 
 
Foreign-owned firms are defined as firms in which foreign owners have at least a 10% equity share. 
For the purpose of distinguishing between the different types of FDI, foreign acquisitions are 
identified as those firms that record a switch from being classified as a domestic firm in the previous 
year to being classified as a foreign firm in the year of acquisition, while where a firm already has 
foreign ownership in the first year of its operation the foreign investment is considered a greenfield 
investment provided that the 10% foreign ownership threshold is achieved. The main descriptive 
statistics and indicators of the importance of foreign firms in the Slovenian manufacturing sector are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
There is a notable and persistent difference between domestic and foreign firms with respect to all 
characteristics seen in the Table 1. As expected, throughout the whole period foreign firms 
demonstrated a higher average size, higher labour and total factor productivity and higher capital 
intensity compared to domestic firms with the only exception of capital intensity in 2002. Foreign 
firms also pay higher average wages and are more export-oriented than their domestic rivals, selling 
around half of their output abroad. A slight convergence between domestic and foreign firms can be 
seen in terms of average labour productivity, which for domestic firms increases by approximately 
80% versus the 60% increase in the average labour productivity of foreign firms within the 1994-2003 
period. On the other hand, domestic firms have been unable to decrease the gap in total factor 
productivity. The average total factor productivity of domestic firms remains practically unchanged 
throughout the period, while foreign firms face an approximate 30% increase compared to the initial 
year 1994. The data suggest that if the constant returns to scale is an acceptable assumption then the 
value-added increase per employee (labour productivity) of domestic firms can be almost exclusively 
                                                 
4 Financial data were obtained from the database of firms’ financial statements collected by the Agency of the 
Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services. The data on firms’ formation, legal and 
organisational forms and termination of operation were obtained from the Business Register of Slovenia. Other 
data were provided from the Statistical office of Republic of Slovenia.   8
attributed to the improvement in the capital equipment of labour (on the assumption of constant 
returns to scale), while improvements in total factor productivity play an important role in foreign 
firms.  
 
Table 1: Average size, labour and total factor productivity, real average annual wage and export 
propensity of domestic and foreign firms in the Slovenian manufacturing sector, 1994-2003  
 
  
Employment 
Labour  
productivity 
TFP Annual  wage
Capital-
intensity 
Export 
propensity 
     
1000 SIT  
(1994 prices) 
dom. firm in
y. 1994=100
1000 SIT  
(1994 prices) 
1000 SIT  
(1994 prices) 
 
    Dom For Dom For Dom  For  Dom For Dom  For  Dom For 
1994  62  114 1963  2879 100 121 724 1275  4139 6459 0.16 0.47 
1995  55  113 2032  2453 101 131 799 1105  4255 4170 0.15 0.45 
1996  49  103 2232  3038 103 132 884 1254  4517 5792 0.15 0.48 
1997  44  93  2417  2924 101 143 985 1324  5748 6133 0.16 0.47 
1998  41  108 2448  3362 100 150  1045  1440  4864 7398 0.16 0.50 
1999  40  111 2711  3934 102 163  1139  1529  5141 7745 0.16 0.50 
2000  36  150 2716  4129 101 170  1194  1676  5324 9330 0.16 0.54 
2001  39  141 3070  4422 102 164  1281  1742  5627 8293 0.16 0.59 
2002  38  139 3406  4107 102 148  1377  1752  8214 8089 0.16 0.55 
2003  37  137 3542  4635 102 155  1477  1886  8159 10940 0.16 0.58 
Note: summary statistics exclude firms with 0 employees and which reported non-positive equity. 
Source: own calculations 
 
In Table 2 selected indicators of the importance of foreign firms in the Slovenian manufacturing sector 
are reported to motivate expectations regarding the impacts of foreign firm entry and their presence on 
the survival of domestic firms. As can be seen in Table 2, the importance of foreign-owned firms 
increased during the period considered according to all measures as a share in the number of firms, 
employment, fixed assets and value added. At the end of our period, foreign firms accounted for 
approximately 18% of manufacturing employment and above 20% of both fixed assets and value 
added. 
 
Table 2: The relative importance of foreign firms in the Slovenian manufacturing sector 
according to selected indicators, 1994-2003 
 
   No of firms  Empl  Fixed assets  value added 
   Domestic  Foreign 
For. firm 
share 
For. firm 
share 
For. firm 
share 
For. firm 
share 
1994  3304 171  4.9  8.4  11.7  12.4 
1995  3910 186  4.5  8.6  11.3  12.3 
1996  4175 243  5.5  10.1  14.6  13.4 
1997  4377 246  5.3  10.7  16.1  14.5 
1998  4437 256  5.5  13.1  19.8  17.7 
1999  4573 247  5.1  13.0  19.1  18.7 
2000  4607 300  6.1  21.4  33.5  32.4 
2001  4693 284  5.7  17.6  22.1  23.2 
2002  4782 347  6.8  20.5  26.0  27.8 
2003  4912 297  5.7  18.2  22.5  21.5 
Note: summary statistics exclude firms with 0 employees.   Source: own calculations   9
 
Since the main concern is the impact of the entry of foreign firms on the exit of local firms, I report in 
Table 3 the entry and exit rates in our sample of firms in the manufacturing sector. According to the 
effective definition, entry rates were highest (well above 10%) at the beginning of the period and then 
calmed down to around 6-8%, while exits (exit rates) reached their peak at 6% in the middle of the 
period considered.  
 
Although the share of foreign greenfield entrants in the total number of entrants never exceeds 5% in 
the 1995-2003 period (see Table 4), it is far from negligible when the fact is considered that foreign 
entrants are on average significantly larger than domestic entrants (an average of 36 employees in 
greenfield entrants versus an average of 19 employees in domestic entrants). In 1996, greenfield 
entrants accounted for almost 17% of total employment created by firms that entered the market in 
1996. This is not surprising as, due to the larger size of their parent companies, foreign entrants are in 
a better position to raise funds to finance their entry on a larger scale. When judging the importance of 
a foreign entry we also have to consider an entry through a foreign acquisition
5 which accounts for 
almost 70% of foreign firm ‘entries’ in terms of the number of firms and much more in terms of 
employment as the average size of a foreign acquisition is 3.5 times larger than that of a greenfield 
entrant and almost 7 times larger than the size of domestic entrants. It is interesting that the average 
size of firms in the year of their foreign acquisition is larger than the average size of foreign 
acquisition firms in the years after the foreign acquisition happened, which suggests that foreign 
investors carry out certain rationalisations in terms of reducing employee numbers.  
 
 
Table 3: Firm entry and exit patterns in the Slovenian manufacturing sector, 1994-2003 
 
  
No.  of 
entrants 
No.  of 
exits 
No.  of active 
firms 
Entry rate  Exit rate 
1994     83  3459     0.024 
1995  797 217  4173  0.191 0.052 
1996  573 269  4529  0.127 0.059 
1997  576 244  4836  0.119 0.050 
1998  351 268  4943  0.071 0.054 
1999  511 226  5186  0.099 0.044 
2000  361 201  5321  0.068 0.038 
2001  343 249  5463  0.063 0.046 
2002  496 220  5710  0.087 0.039 
2003  389 68  5879  0.066     
Note: summary statistics exclude firms with 0 employees. 
The number of active firms throughout the period is greater than the number reported in Table 2 since for some 
firms data were not reported for the whole period of their operation. In Table 2 I only consider firms that are in 
the database in a particular year (data were reported), while in Table 3 firms that are not in the database in a 
particular year but were active before and after the year of missing data are also counted. 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Table 4 shows that the three types of entrants differ widely with respect to a number of characteristics. 
Besides the fact that foreign entrants are larger, they also pay higher wages and are more capital-
                                                 
5 However, foreign acquisitions are not considered in the group of entrant firms, as they were already operating 
before foreign owners acquire their share (above 10%) in these firms.    10
intensive than domestic firms. While the average labour productivity of acquired foreign firms in the 
year of acquisition is higher than the labour productivity of ‘true entrants’, there is practically no 
difference between the average productivity of domestic and greenfield entrants (although there is 
significant variability across different years).  
 
 
Table 4: Number of entrants and their average size, labour productivity, capital-intensity and 
real average annual wage according to the entrants’ ownership type in the Slovenian 
manufacturing sector, 1994-2003 
 
Note: summary statistics exclude firms with 0 employees. 
Source: own calculations 
 
The above-average performance of foreign firms and their larger size upon entry satisfy the principal 
starting point of theories on MNEs, postulating that to be able to compensate for the inherent 
disadvantages of operating in foreign markets MNEs must possess certain capabilities which give 
them some sort of competitive advantage over their domestic rivals. The question open to empirical 
testing is then whether foreign firms with their superior performance have a significant impact on the 
survival of local firms and thus firm selection processes in the way the theory suggests.  
 
3.  Empirical model specification and a description of the variables 
 
According to the exit model specification (4) the factors that affect a firm’s exit decision are classified 
in four groups: (i) firm characteristics (λt); (ii) industry or product market characteristics (γt), (iii) 
factor prices (τt); and (iv) other exogenous factors (θt) that reflect conditions outside the domestic 
industry (τt and θt factors are both captured by the inclusion of annual dummies). Various factors 
proposed by different theoretical models and empirical studies are included in empirical specifications. 
A higher-order logarithmic expansion in two principal firm-specific variables (firm’s size and age) 
was tested until there is no evidence of further nonlinearity. Similarly as in several other studies, a 
second-order logarithmic expansion in a firm’s size and age and a first-order logarithmic expansion in 
other variables was confirmed which yields the following regression equation of the firm exit model 
(4): 
 
Pr(dexitit=1) = β0+β1MNEentryjt+β2MNEentry·dTFPlowjt+β3dTFPlowijt+β4entryjt+ 
 
  No of entrants  Empl  Labour prod.  Capital-intensity  Wage 
     1000 SIT (1994 prices)  1000 SIT (1994 prices)  1000 SIT (1994 p.) 
   Dom Green Acquis  Dom Green Acquis Dom  Green Acquis Dom Green  Acquis  Dom Green Acquis
1995  784 13  7  21  40  12  1659 2160  1585 4310 4518 1085  586  845 615 
1996  548 25  53  17  75  42  1779 3678  2294 3849 14560 4813  617  791 1315 
1997  553 23  19  24  22  125  2497 774 3034 5202 13360 5910  797  912 1310 
1998  341 10  14  19  54  173  1057 1354  3593 4544 24789 8502  712  1560  1498 
1999  509  2  0  18  1     2455  2775     3810  7129     931  213    
2000  348 13  96  20  44  198  2125 5152  3825 7862 10894  10206  899  1850  1615 
2001  333 10  31  14  16  123  2676 1512  2983 4998 7094 3619  852  912 1547 
2002  476  20 59 25 8 105  3288  2056  3074  12696  8976  5668  1101 1209  1607 
2003  372  17  4  10  26  24  3569 1064 2135 12686 28297 3161  1163 1676 2384 
 
1995-2003                                     
entrants      19  36  128  2296  2242  3146  6336  14025  6830  823  1155  1509 
Non 
entrants           45  123  97  2656  3596  3548  5170  7283  6708  1135 1544  1538   11
β5hFDIjt+β6hFDI·lnWageijt+β7ReghFDIjrt+β8BackFDIjt+β9BackConcjt+β10ForFDIjt+ 
β11ForConcjt+β12IMintjt+β13IMintjt·COMPLjt+β14COMPLjt+β15fdiijt+β16HHIjt+β17plantsij+ 
β18dexportit+β19dexmajorit+β20dprofitijt+β21lnEmplijt+β22lnEmpl2ijt+β23lnKintijt+β24lnTFPijt+ 
β25lnWageijt+β26lnAgeijt+β27lnAge2ijt+∑β28,tdyeart+∑β29,jdindustryj+∑β30,rdregionr+ 
∑β31,odownertypel +ηi+εijt         ( 5 )  
 
where subscripts i, j and t refer to firms, industries and years, respectively. Ln in variable names 
denotes the natural logarithm of a particular variable, while 2 (sq) denotes that the variable enters the 
estimation in a squared form. All values of the financial variables are deflated using producer prices 
indices at the 2-digit NACE classification.  
 
Firm characteristics  
Among the principal firm characteristics that affect a firm’s exit decision the theories postulate a 
firm’s size, age and productivity. The size of a firm (emplijt) is measured by the number of employees. 
Ageijt denotes a firm’s age counting from its formation year according to the Business Register. As age 
enters our empirical models in a logarithmic form I start to count age with a value of 1 in order to 
prevent the dropping of observations in the first year of a firm’s operation, which would generate 
sample selection bias due to the relatively high infant mortality rates. I also test the robustness of the 
results by including an age variable in a non-logarithmic form and the results are robust. Productivity 
is measured as total factor productivity (TFPijt) based on production function estimates (see the next 
section). Firm dynamics models predict that smaller and younger firms are less likely to survive but 
they grow faster than old and large firms. This predicted size-growth relationship sharply contradicts 
Gibrat’s traditional law of independence between the growth of a firm and its size. The productivity of 
the firm is expected to negatively affect the likelihood of an exit.  
 
Further, I include capital-intensity  Kintijt, measured by real fixed assets per worker. The capital 
intensity of a firm is expected to positively affect its ability to survive and grow. According to the 
Olley and Pakes (1996) model, the stock of physical capital affects the distribution of future plant 
productivity
6. In this case, capital intensity may act as a proxy for other unobserved sources of 
efficiency leading to the higher likelihood of an exit and lower growth for low-capital-intensity plants.  
 
Wageijt is defined as the average yearly real wage per employee. Unfortunately, data on the skill 
structure of employees is not available; therefore I also use the wage variable as a proxy for the skill 
intensity of a firm. This implies I am assuming that wages for similar education level/qualification 
categories of workers are similar across firms and industries. The real wage is also used as a proxy for 
human capital in Mata and Portugal (2004). Skill intensity is expected to positively affect a firm’s 
survival ability and its growth potential as it can serve as a proxy for its absorptive and learning 
capacity, which is a key determinant of the course of a firm’s life.  
 
As I use a firm as a unit of observation I must control for the number of firm i’s subsidiaries (plantsij) 
as the theory and empirical evidence suggests that hazard and growth rates differ between a single- 
and multi-plant firm. Among the firms’ characteristics I additionally control for a firm’s profitability 
by including the dummy variable dprofitijt which equals 1 for firms with a positive net profit in year t. 
For testing the impact of the exporting two additional dummy variables are included: dexportit and 
dexmajorit. dexportit equals 1 for all exporters (positive sales in foreign markets), while dexmajorit 
takes the value of 1 in the case that export propensity – the share of a firm’s output supplied to foreign 
markets in the firm’s total sales  – is greater than 70%. 
                                                 
6 There is a relationship between a producer's underlying efficiency and the incentive to invest in capital. 
Essentially, efficient firms generate higher levels of investment and larger capital stocks.   12
Industry characteristics 
Besides the time-invariant market characteristics that are captured in the set of industry dummies, I 
include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index HHIjt to measure market concentration. HHIjt is defined as 
the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms within a particular industry at the 5-digit 
NACE level. The market share of firm i is defined as the share of its domestic market sales in total 
industry sales in the domestic market (all firms’ local sales + imports in industry j). The expected 
effect of market concentration it is not so clear-cut. On one hand, the concentration ratio is expected to 
have a positive impact on the survival and growth of firms. The argument is that the price level is 
more likely to be elevated above the long-run average cost at the minimum efficient scale (MES) level 
of output in concentrated industries which may facilitate the survival of suboptimal scale firms which 
is what typical entrant firms are. On the other hand, firms in highly concentrated markets may be 
subjected to fierce aggressive behaviour by rivals which may reduce their chances of survival. 
 
The principal explanatory variables in the paper refer to the entry and presence of foreign-owned firms 
to test for both direct and indirect effects of inward FDI measured by the extent of foreign affiliates’ 
operations in the host country. Concerning the indirect impacts of inward FDI on domestic firm 
dynamics, I test for the presence and relative strength of two opposing effects as predicted by theory: 
the competition effect and productivity spillovers. 
 
The competition effect is tested with the entry rate variables MNEentryjt, GREENentryjt, 
ACQUISentryjt, and entryjt at the 3-digit level of the NACE classification. MNEentryjt denotes the 
foreign firm entry rate defined as the number of foreign entrants (greenfield and acquisitions) divided 
by the total number of firms operating in the industry j, GREENentryjt and ACQUISentryjt define entry 
rates considering only greenfield or acquisition entrants, respectively, and entryjt  as an entry rate 
considering all entrants including domestic and foreign ones. All three measures exclude the firm for 
which the observation is taken. MNEentryjt, GREENentryjt and ACQUISentryjt test the crowding-out 
effect which takes place upon foreign firms’ entry, while entryjt serves as a controlling variable to 
control for the impact of a new firm entry in general. It is possible that all firm entries in a particular 
industry rather than foreign firm entries alone affect the exit decision and growth of incumbent firms 
so I therefore want to control for this possibility. As it is quite likely that MNEs are attracted to 
industries that offer favourable conditions which also stimulates domestic firm entry levels, estimates 
that do not control for this possibility may lead to an overestimation of the crowding-out effect of 
foreign firms’ entry. 
 
MNEentry·dTFPlowjt is the interaction term between MNEentryjt and dTFPlowijt, where dTFPlowijt is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the lowest quintile in terms of total factor productivity at the 3-
digit level of NACE and 0 for other more efficient ones. If the least efficient firms are more likely to 
be crowded out by the entry of a foreign firm this interaction term should have a negative effect on 
firm growth and survival (a positive sign in the exit equation).  
 
The presence of horizontal (intra-industry) spillover effects is tested by the variable hFDIjt  that 
measures the concentration of foreign firms in industry j as the foreign firms’ share in total industry 
employment: 
 
∑
∑
=
=
⋅
= n
i
ijt
n
i
ijt ijt
jt
empl
fdi empl
hFDI
1
1 ;         ( 6 )  
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where n denotes the number of all firms in industry j and emplijt denotes the number of employees in 
firm  i. fdiijt is a dummy variable for foreign ownership. It takes a value of 1 for ‘foreign firms’ 
considering a 10% ownership share threshold. The measure excludes the firm for which the 
observation is taken. The employment share of foreign firms is used in many studies testing the 
presence of horizontal spillover effects, among others (Barrios et al., 2005), (Keller and Yeaple, 2003), 
(Görg and Strobl, 2003). Instead of the employment share, other studies also consider foreign firms’ 
share in the industry’s output (Smarzynska, 2004), and the relative number of foreign firms (De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003). Some studies also take into account the share of foreign equity 
participation in foreign firms, including (Aitken et al., 1999) and (Smarzynska, 2004). 
 
hFDI·lnWageijt is the interaction term between hFDIjt  and  ln(Wageijt).  As described above, I use 
ln(Wageijt) as a proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity. If firms with a higher absorptive capacity are 
more able to take advantage of a foreign firm’s presence in the industry, this term should have a 
negative sign in the exit equation and thus provide some support for the validity of the theoretical 
prediction that intra-industry spillover effects are stronger for local firms with a higher absorptive 
capacity (skill intensity). 
 
ReghFDIjrt measures regional intra-industry foreign firm concentration in terms of employment share 
and tests whether any intra-industry spillovers are reinforced when domestically-owned firms are 
located close to foreign firms. More specifically, it is defined as: 
∑
∑
=
=
⋅
= m
i
ijrt
m
i
ijt ijrt
jrt
empl
fdi empl
ghFDI
1
1 Re ,       ( 7 )  
 
where m denotes the number of firms within industry i and region r (at the NUTS 3 level). 
 
The inter-industry spillover effects are tested through two additional explanatory variables BackFDIjt 
and ForFDIjt measuring the concentration of FDI in backwardly- and forwardly-linked industries with 
industry j. BackFDIjt measures the extent of potential contacts between local suppliers and foreign 
firms (vertical connections between local suppliers and foreign affiliates – customers) and thus tests 
the presence of ‘backward’ inter-industry spillovers: 
 
∑
≠
⋅ =
j k k
kt jk jt hFDI BackFDI
;
α ,         ( 8 )  
 
where technical coefficient αjk denotes the share of product j originating from domestic production that 
is used by industry k in its intermediate consumption (excluding final use and imports of intermediate 
products). This variable accounts for the impact of foreign affiliates on their upstream local suppliers, 
that is for the impact of the concentration of foreign firms in industries to which industry j supplies its 
output. Following Smarzynska (2004), inputs supplied within an industry are not included since this 
effect is accounted for by the variable measuring the horizontal spillovers - hFDIjt. 
 
The extent of potential contacts between local customers and foreign firms-suppliers (through forward 
linkages) is measured by ForFDIjt : 
 
∑
≠
⋅ =
j k k
kt jk jt hFDI ForFDI
;
δ ,         ( 9 )  
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where the technical coefficient δjk denotes the share of input k in the total intermediate consumption of 
industry j.
7  This variable accounts for the impact of foreign affiliates on their downstream local 
customers (the impact of the concentration of foreign firms in industries that provide inputs for 
industry j). A negative and statistically significant coefficient in the exit model would suggest there are 
indeed positive inter-industry externalities connected to the concentration of foreign-owned firms in 
vertically-linked industries. 
 
To control for the possibility that the general concentration of economic activity in interrelated 
industries rather than the concentration of foreign firm activity alone positively affects the survival of 
local firms and that at the same time FDI is attracted to the prosperous industries, I include BackConcjt 
and ForConcjt as controlling variables and thus avoid any potential overestimation of vertical spillover 
effects. BackConcjt and ForConcjt are defined as backwardly- and forwardly-linked industries’ share of 
total manufacturing employment weighted by technical coefficients α and δ. 
 
IMintjt measures import intensity as a share of imports in total industry sales in the domestic market 
(all firms’ local sales + imports in industry j). The degree of complementarity between foreign 
affiliates’ local sales and imports is measured by the degree of their overlapping COMPLjt: 
 
 
ijt
j n n
ijt
ijt
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⋅ −
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∈
,
,
jt 1 COMPL
,        (10) 
 
where COMPLjt ranges between 0 and 1. It is equal to 0 for industries without overlapping (only 
imports or only foreign firms’ local sales within the industry j) and approaches 1 for industries with 
high overlapping. The interaction term between IMintjt·COMPLjt tests if the impact of imports differs 
among industries with different levels of complementarity between local sales of foreign affiliates and 
imports. 
 
To control for the industry-, time- and region-specific effects throughout our 1994-2003 sample period 
I include annual dummies dyeart, industry dummies at the 3-digit level of NACE dindustryj, region 
dummies at the NUTS level dregionr, and dummies for ownership type downertypel discriminating 
among different types of ownership. 
 
Several other variables were also tested but, due to insignificant coefficients in all empirical 
specifications, were not included in final empirical models. Among others, I test for the effect of the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets, for the minimum efficient scale defined as the log of median 
employment size in industry j and industry growth with respect to the previous year defined as the 
growth of total employment within particular industry j. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Technical coefficients αjk and δjk are obtained from the input-output table, more specifically from ‘Use table for 
the domestic output at basic prices’. As the input-output table for the Slovenian economy is not available for all 
years in our 1994-2003 sample, the year 2000’s I-O table was chosen as a base for the technical (input) 
coefficient calculation. BackFDIjt and ForFDIjt are constructed at the two-digit level of NACE which is the most 
detailed level of the I-O table available. 
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4.  Econometric issues  
 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
There are several potential econometric problems of estimating probit exit models with 
heteroscedasticity being one of the earliest to be identified (e.g. Hall (1987), Evans (1987)). Most 
models of heterogeneous firm dynamics namely predict that firm size and age affect the conditional 
variance of the firm’s growth and exit decision. Indeed, most studies actually confirmed that the 
variability of firm growth decreases with firm size suggesting that variance is not constant across 
firms. To deal with potential heteroscedasticity in exit models I apply a heteroscedastic probit model 
that generalises the probit model by generalising the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a 
standard normal random variable Ф() with a mean of 0 and variance of 1 to a normal CDF with a 
variance no longer fixed at 1 but allowed to vary as a function of the independent variables. Following 
Harvey (1976), the general formulation of the heteroscedastic model is: 
 
  P r ( y i=1) = Ф(xib/exp(ziγ) ) ,         ( 1 1 )  
 
where Var[εi]=σi
2=[exp(ziγ)]
2.  
 
Unobserved heterogeneity-endogeneity problem 
To control for the possibility that unobserved firm-specific effects are correlated with regressors and 
thus to obtain consistent maximum likelihood estimates in probit models, I parameterise unobserved 
heterogeneity (unobserved firm-specific effects - ηi) in the manner suggested by Mundlak (1978), 
Chamberlain (1984), Wooldridge (2002): 
 
   i i i u X + + = 1 0 α α η          ( 1 2 )  
 
where unobserved heterogeneity ηi is a linear function of a vector of the firm-level means of all time-
varying independent variables over the sample period ( i X ) and ui is assumed to be distributed N(0, 
σu
2) and independent of X variables and the idiosyncratic error term εit (Kosová (2004) uses the same 
approach). In addition, annual industry-level means of all firm-time-varying independent variables X 
are included to account for the industry-specific shocks that are not captured by the industry 
characteristics explicitly included in the empirical model specifications. 
 
Endogeneity 
Another potential econometric concern which may cause biased estimates when testing for the direct 
impact of foreign ownership on a firm’s exit decision is the possibility that the foreign ownership 
dummy variable (fdiijt) might not be entirely exogenous. It is usually argued that foreign investors tend 
to acquire shares in the most successful and larger firms and that foreign ownership is thus not 
randomly distributed (see Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Evenett and Voicu (2001), Damijan et al. 
(2003)). In this case, fdiijt is potentially a choice variable that might be correlated with unobservables 
relegated to the error term. More specifically, fdiijt may be endogenous if the decision for FDI (in the 
form of foreign acquisitions) is correlated with unobservables that affect a firm’s exit decision/growth. 
For instance, if foreign investors are more likely to acquire shares in more successful firms and 
therefore experience a lower probability of exiting or higher growth ceteris paribus, then if I fail to 
control for this correlation results will underestimate (overestimate) the effect of foreign ownership on 
the probability of exiting (growth).  
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To deal with this problem I instrument for fdiijt and employ instrumental variables models. I use the 
two-stage method proposed by Newey (1987)
8 for limited dependent variable models with endogenous 
explanatory variables to estimate the exit model. The instruments employed are size, size squared, age, 
age squared, the ratio of net profits to sales, export propensity, total factor productivity and average 
wage. I use lagged values of these instruments for domestic firms, values of the instruments in the year 
before an acquisition takes place for firms that have been acquired by foreign investors and the first-
year values for greenfield FDI. To avoid autocorrelation the first-year observations for greenfield 
investments are dropped. 
 
Total factor productivity estimates 
There are additional potential econometric concerns related to the estimation of a firm’s total factor 
productivity. Typically, total factor productivity is estimated as the residual in the production function 
estimates based on firm-level panel data.
9 Simultaneity bias is usually referred to as the endogeneity of 
production inputs, caused by a correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels 
causing the regressors and the error term to be correlated which makes OLS estimates inconsistent. 
Bias thus occurs when at least part of the TFP is observed by the firm early enough to allow the firm 
to change its factor input decision.  
 
Several methods of controlling for simultaneity bias are proposed in the literature. Olley and Pakes 
(1996) developed an estimator that uses investment as a proxy for these unobservable productivity 
shocks. One of the drawbacks of Olley and Pakes’ (1996) approach is that there must be a strictly 
monotonous relationship between the proxy (investment) and output for obtaining consistent 
estimates. This means that observations with a zero investment have to be dropped from the sample. 
Therefore, to avoid truncating observations with a zero investment I follow Levinsohn and Petrin’s 
(2003) approach and employ their two-step estimator which uses intermediate inputs as proxies. 
Another of the advantages of this estimator is that intermediates may respond more smoothly to 
productivity shocks and may respond more fully to the entire productivity term than investment 
(investment is, namely, associated with substantial adjustment costs). 
 
5.  Results 
 
 
The results of the heteroscedastic pooled probit model of a firm’s exit (5) with standard error adjusted 
for firm clusters which specifies that observations are independent only across clusters (firms) but not 
necessarily within clusters (firms) are reported in Table 5 for the sample of all firms, and in Appendix 
1 for the sub-sample of domestically-owned firms. All estimates include means of independent 
variables to control for unobserved ‘correlated’ heterogeneity according to (12). For all estimated 
specifications of the exit model Wald’s test of a full versus a constant only model indicates that the 
full model is significant at negligible risk. While based on Wald’s test for heteroscedasticity in the 
form of σi
2 =[exp(γ·lnEmpli)]
2 I reject the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variance (i.e. H0: ln(σi
2)=0) 
at negligible risk. The estimated γ is negative and ranges between -0.12 and -0.14 which confirms the 
                                                 
8 I perform instrumental variable probit estimates using the STATA module developed by Gelbach (1999,   
[http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/p/probitiv.ado], 5.10.2005) 
9 Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas production function the following form is obtained: 
γ β α
it it it M K L A Y it it ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ,     
where α+β+γ=1 would imply constant returns to scale. Yit denotes the output (gross revenue), Ait is called total 
factor productivity, Lit and Mit are freely variable inputs labour and intermediate inputs (material costs) and Kit is 
a measure of the state variable capital.   17
expected negative relation between variance and a firm’s size. For this reason, only probit estimation 
results corrected for heteroscedasticity are reported.  
 
Besides, I use a random-effects probit estimator to also explicitly account for that part of heterogeneity 
that is uncorrelated with firm-level means (ui). The likelihood ratio test which compares the pooled 
(probit) estimator with the panel estimator with an asymptotic distribution of a 50:50 mixture of chi-
square with no degrees of freedom (i.e. the point mass at zero) and a chi-square with 1 degree of 
freedom fails to reject the homogeneity (the null of no heterogeneity) (Appendix 2). This suggests that 
the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component (ρ) (after 
controlling for firm-level means) is unimportant and the panel estimator is not different from the 
pooled estimator. Therefore, I report and comment on the results based on a pooled probit estimator 
only, and present random-effects probit estimates in Appendix 2. The results also remain unchanged 
when corrected for the effects of outliers. 
 
Regarding the key variables, the results of the aggregate sample (Table 5) confirm the expected 
positive impact of a foreign firm’s entry via FDI on the probability of incumbent firms exiting as the 
estimated coefficient on the variable MNEentryjt  is positive and significant. The evidence of the 
crowding-out effect upon foreign firms’ entry is robust to the inclusion of the controlling variable for 
the general entry rate. The expectation that a foreign firm’s entry does not affect the probability of 
exiting equally for all operating firms is tested by the inclusion of the interaction term 
MNEentry·dTFPlowjt (Model 2, Table 5). It turns out that this interaction term has a positive and 
highly significant impact, while MNEentryjt becomes insignificant which indicates that the crowding-
out effect is only significant for the least efficient firms from the lowest quintile in terms of total factor 
productivity, while there is no significant evidence that more efficient firms would suffer a negative 
impact on their survival probabilities. This result lends support to the prediction that the probability of 
exiting after a foreign firm entry increases the most among the least efficient firms  in the host 
economy. Expressing the marginal effects at sample mean
10 I find that if the foreign firm entry rate 
increases by one structural point the exit probability increases on average by 8.7% (Model 1, Table 5), 
while for the least efficient firms the exit probability increases by almost 24% (Model 2, Table 5).  
 
While the evidence on the crowding out of local firms upon foreign firm entry is clear, the results are 
less conclusive regarding the influence of foreign firm concentration within the industry tested with 
the hFDIjt variable. However, an insignificant coefficient, as also found in a previous study on the 
Slovenian manufacturing sector by Damijan, Knell, Majcen, and Rojec (2003), cannot be interpreted 
as an indication of the absence of horizontal spillover effects as it measures the net effect of any 
positive productivity spillovers and the continuous crowding-out effect. To further explore this effect, 
I include an additional interaction term between hFDIjt and absorptive capacity measured by the real 
average wage. It turns out that the expectations are grounded; both coefficients for hFDIjt and 
hFDIlnwagejt become significant at 10% (Model 2, Table 5). The negative sign of the interaction term 
suggests that the ability to benefit from MNEs’ presence increases with the skill-intensity of a firm and 
therefore it can be expected that the probability of net positive spillover effects is higher for skill-
intensive firms identified as those that pay higher average real wages, which points to the importance 
of the absorptive capacity of firms. The results thus suggest that within those industries facing a 
significant foreign firm presence a firm’s skill-intensity offsets some of the increased probability of 
exiting and that the probability of survival increases with skill-intensity more rapidly in those 
industries with a higher concentration of foreign firm activity (in terms of employment share). 
                                                 
10 Marginal effects refer to the marginal probability change at the mean of independent variables or the change in 
probability for a discrete change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1.   18
However, there is no evidence that intra-industry effects would be intensified in the case of the local 
concentration of foreign firm activity (where local is defined as being located in the same region).  
 
 
Table 5: Heteroscedastic probit exit model estimates for the aggregate sample of foreign and 
domestic firms 
 
  Coef. 
Margina
l effects 
dP/dX 
Coef. 
Marginal 
effects 
dP/dX 
Coef. 
Margina
l effects 
dP/dX 
Coef. 
Margina
l effects 
dP/ dX 
Model 1  1  2  2  3  3  4  4 
MNEentry 
2.026** 
(2.22)  0.0092  0.937 
(0.87)  0.0041     1.932** 
(2.10)  0.0086 
GREENentry 
 
     1.814 
(1.10)  0.0080    
ACQUISentry 
 
     2.135** 
(1.95)  0.0094    
MNEentry· 
  dTFPlow 
   4.551*** 
(2.56)  0.0198        
dTFPlow     -0.066 
(-1.19)  -0.0003        
entry 
0.007 
(0.01)  0.0000  0.016 
(0.03)  0.0001  0.023 
(0.05)  0.0001  0.030 
(0.07)  0.0001 
hFDI 
0.039 
(0.20)  0.0002  2.134* 
(1.63)  0.0093  2.290* 
(1.76)  0.0100  0.034 
(0.17)  0.0002 
hFDI· 
  lnWage 
   -0.349* 
(-1.79)  -0.0015  -0.375** 
(-1.93)  -0.0016    
ReghFDI 
0.129 
(0.47)  0.0006  0.237 
(0.79)  0.0010  0.202 
(0.68)  0.0009  0.133 
(0.48)  0.0006 
BackFDI 
1.980 
(1.27)  0.0090  1.932 
(1.21)  0.0084  1.979 
(1.24)  0.0087  11.035*** 
(2.95)  0.0494 
BackFDI· 
  lnWage 
       -1.229*** 
(-2.86)  -0.0055 
BackConc 
-6.560 
(-0.43)  -0.0298  -6.963 
(-0.43)  -0.0302  -6.103 
(-0.38)  -0.0268  -6.954 
(-0.44)  -0.0311 
ForFDI 
-2.933* 
(-1.79)  -0.0133  -3.551** 
(-2.10)  -0.0154  -3.644** 
(-2.17)  -0.0160  -3.745 
(-0.54)  -0.0168 
ForFDI· 
  lnWage 
       0.032 
(0.03)  0.0001 
ForConc 
-4.430 
(-0.31)  -0.0201  -2.144 
(-0.15)  -0.0093  -2.271 
(-0.16)  -0.0100  -2.489 
(-0.17)  -0.0111 
IMint 
0.168 
(1.17)  0.0008  0.072 
(0.46)  0.0003  0.065 
(0.42)  0.0003  0.174 
(1.20)  0.0008 
Imint· 
  COMPL 
   1.192** 
(2.26)  0.0052  1.196** 
(2.27)  0.0052    
COMPL     -0.169 
(-1.10)  -0.0007  -0.171 
(-1.11)  -0.0008    
plants 
-0.059*** 
(-2.80)  -0.0003  -0.058*** 
(-2.82)  -0.0003  -0.058*** 
(-2.80)  -0.0003  -0.061*** 
(-2.84)  -0.0003 
HHI 
0.126 
(0.65)  0.0006  0.222 
(1.16)  0.0010  0.221 
(1.15)  0.0010  0.128 
(0.66)  0.0006 
dexport 
-0.010 
(-0.23)  0.0000  -0.012 
(-0.29)  -0.0001  -0.012 
(-0.28)  -0.0001  -0.010 
(-0.23)  0.0000 
dexmajor 
0.132** 
(2.29)  0.0007  0.132** 
(2.27)  0.0007  0.131** 
(2.27)  0.0007  0.132** 
(2.28)  0.0007 
dprofit 
-0.375*** 
(-6.15)  -0.0033  -0.373*** 
(-6.11)  -0.0032  -0.370*** 
(-6.07)  -0.0032  -0.371*** 
(-6.08)  -0.0032 
fdi 
0.030 
(0.37)  0.0001  0.026 
(0.32)  0.0001  0.025 
(0.30)  0.0001  0.031 
(0.38)  0.0001 
lnEmpl 
-0.670*** 
(-9.05)  -0.0044  -0.666*** 
(-8.95)  -0.0042  -0.664*** 
(-8.98)  -0.0043  -0.673*** 
(-9.02)  -0.0044   19
lnEmpl2 
0.048*** 
(3.18)  0.0002  0.048*** 
(3.11)  0.0002  0.048*** 
(3.11)  0.0002  0.048*** 
(3.15)  0.0002 
lnTFP 
-0.220*** 
(-4.17)  -0.0010  -0.228*** 
(-3.75)  -0.0010  -0.219*** 
(-4.13)  -0.0010  -0.219*** 
(-4.15)  -0.0010 
lnKint 
-0.186*** 
(-7.91)  -0.0008  -0.191*** 
(-8.08)  -0.0008  -0.190*** 
(-8.09)  -0.0008  -0.187*** 
(-7.92)  -0.0008 
lnWage 
-0.330*** 
(-7.13)  -0.0015  -0.298*** 
(-5.93)  -0.0013  -0.292*** 
(-5.82)  -0.0013  -0.257*** 
(-3.25)  -0.0012 
lnAge 
-0.205 
(-1.10)  -0.0009  -0.239 
(-1.27)  -0.0010  -0.226 
(-1.21)  -0.0010  -0.213 
(-1.15)  -0.0010 
lnAge2 
1.416*** 
(17.38)  0.0064  1.439*** 
(17.36)  0.0062  1.430*** 
(17.35)  0.0063  1.422*** 
(17.61)  0.0064 
Cons 
7.258*** 
(4.71)    6.701*** 
(4.23)    6.582*** 
(4.18)    6.672*** 
(4.19)   
Wald’s test for heteroscedasticity. H0: lnsigma2=0 
lnsigma2 
 
      lempl 
-0.128*** 
(-6.35)    -0.129*** 
(-6.43)    -0.130*** 
(-6.49)    -0.127*** 
(-6.26)   
chi2(1) 
(Prob>chi2) 
40.310 
(0.000)    41.300 
(0.000)    42.090 
(0.000)    39.200 
(0.000)   
pseudo R2  47.2  47.4  47.3  47.3  
Log pseudo-
likelihood  -2583.253  -2560.287  -2563.256  -2579.002 
   
industry dummies   INCL  INCL  INCL  INCL  
time dummies  INCL  INCL  INCL  INCL  
regional dummies  INCL  INCL  INCL  INCL  
ownership dumm.  INCL  INCL  INCL  INCL  
N  34272  34042  34042  34272  
Pr(y=1) in sample   0.03233   0.0324   0.03237  0.0323 
Pr(y=1) mean of 
model prediction   0.03236   0.0324   0.03242  0.0324 
Pr(y=1) predicted 
at means 
 0.00106   0.0010   0.00102  0.0010 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses,  
-  Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance 
- for dummy variables marginal effect dP/dX is for a discrete change from 0 to 1 
-  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
The above results provide strong support for the prediction that a foreign firm’s entry stimulates the 
selection process among firms within the same industry based on their productive efficiency. More 
specifically, the selection process is characterised by the least efficient firms experiencing a drop in 
their survival probability upon a foreign firm’s entry. On the other hand, more efficient and more skill-
intensive firms do not experience any pronounced ‘static’ crowding out and they have a higher ability 
to benefit in the long term from the foreign firms’ presence. The significant difference between 
domestic and foreign entry in terms of their reallocation forces corresponds well to the theoretical 
predictions that foreign firms enter on a larger scale and tend to be above-average productive. 
 
Distinguishing between greenfield entry and foreign firm entry through acquisition (Model 3, Table 
5), I find that although the magnitude of the crowding-out effect of these two types of FDI is not 
significantly different according to the F-test, only the coefficient of the acquisition entry is confirmed 
as significant. This result contradicts the general conviction of greater crowding out being associated 
with greenfield entry. However, knowing from Tables 1-4 that acquisition entrants are larger and more 
productive than their greenfield counterparts and account for the majority of foreign firm entries, the   20
result might not be that surprising. In addition, it can be argued that a foreign entry in the form of an 
acquisition has a more immediate effect on local firms compared to a greenfield entry.  
 
Regarding inter-industry spillovers I find a significantly negative effect of a foreign firms’ presence on 
the probability of local firms exiting through forward linkages, suggesting that the presence of foreign 
affiliates does reduce the exit probability of their downstream local customers. Positive forward 
spillover effects are still significant after controlling for the general concentration of economic activity 
in vertically-linked industries. According to the literature, local firms may benefit from their upstream 
foreign firm suppliers through several potential channels such as through the increased availability of 
inputs, through their qualitative improvement and/or price reduction etc. Interestingly, the beneficial 
effect on the price decline of intermediates is also emphasised as an important channel of increased 
foreign competition (through imports) in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003)’s model 
simulations. However, more detailed data would be needed to test for these different channels.  
 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the presence of foreign firms would significantly affect the 
probability of shutting down their upstream local suppliers (through backward linkages). This result, at 
least at first sight, contradicts recent findings of positive productivity externalities connected to the 
extent of foreign firm presence through backward linkages for several transition countries (for 
instance, Damijan, Knell, Majcen, Rojec (2003) for Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, and 
Smarzynska (2004) for Lithuania). However, the studies mentioned above estimate vertical 
(backward) spillovers conditioned on the survival of domestic firms in the upstream industry and only 
consider larger firms with more than 10 employees which are less likely to exit the market. Taking 
into account findings on the positive effects of MNEs’ presence in backwardly-linked industries on the 
productivity of surviving firms and their insignificant impact on the probability of surviving, it seems 
quite likely that some firms face an increased probability of exiting in response to the concentration of 
foreign firms in downstream industries (Model 4 suggests these are less skill-intensive firms), while 
the successful surviving firms are able to take advantage of the MNEs’ presence in downstream 
industries through backward linkages. This leads us to suspect that the degree of linkages might be 
weaker in the case of MNEs compared to domestic firms, leading to a decrease in demand for 
intermediate products.  
 
To test this argument further, I include interaction terms between vertical FDI concentration and 
absorptive capacity in the way I did for the horizontal spillover effects (Model 4, Table 5). Similarly, 
as confirmed for the intra-industry effects of FDI presence, both coefficients positive for BackFDIjt 
and negative for its interaction with skill-intensity become significant. It appears that it is more likely 
that for firms which are relatively less skill-intensive a vertical crowding out would prevail over 
positive externalities, while for skilled intensive firms there is more scope for the net positive effect 
from vertical FDI concentration. The net impact is thus insignificant but there is evidence that the 
selection process induced by a foreign firm’s entry and presence also takes place through backward 
linkages (vertical crowding out). Under the presence of vertical crowding out, those studies that do not 
control for the impact on the exit of local firms overestimate the degree of spillover effects from 
foreign to local firms through backward linkages. On the other hand, there is no evidence that 
absorptive capacity would play an important role in taking advantage of FDI concentration in 
forwardly-linked industries. The results suggest that the ability to benefit from the relationship with 
foreign suppliers is not systematically related to a firm’s absorptive capacity. 
 
Regarding the competition effect from increased imports, I find the positive but insignificant impact of 
import intensity in general on a firm’s probability of exiting. The significant and positive interaction 
term, however, indicates that the import crowding-out effect increases with the degree of 
complementarity between foreign affiliates’ sales in imports.    21
 
The impacts of other standard variables in exit and growth models are in line with the theoretical 
predictions. Size, age and total factor productivity all have a negative effect on the probability of 
exiting and are all highly significant, with the exception of age. The second-order terms of size and 
age are both significantly positive, confirming the nonlinear relation between firm size (age) and the 
probability of exiting, and are in accordance with several other studies that also found the presence of 
their nonlinear size and age effects. Among other firm characteristics that affect the prospects of 
survival, as expected average wage, capital intensity and the profit dummy are found to reduce the 
probability of exiting which indicates the importance of the skill and capital intensity of the firm and 
its overall successfulness for the firm’s survival.  
 
The number of a firm’s subsidiaries decreases the probability of exiting, which corresponds to the 
prediction that multi-plant firms have a lower probability of death compared to single-plant firms, with 
everything else being equal. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, there is no significant positive 
effect of being an exporter in terms of a lower probability of exiting. The probability of exiting is in 
fact greater for exporters that sell the majority of their output in foreign markets. The results suggest 
that firms with an export propensity above 70% are more vulnerable and more likely to shut down, 
everything else being equal, than exporters with a lower export propensity or firms oriented to the 
domestic market. The reason could be the greater exposure to higher external competition, as argued 
by Könings and Xavier (2002) who also found a negative effect of exporting status on firm survival 
for Slovenian manufacturing firms but in a different period. Another reason may be related to the fact 
that an important share of these ‘majority exporters’ involves firms that are contractors to foreign 
firms in, typically, labour-intensive industries that face increased international competition from low-
wage countries. Regarding the effect of industry-specific factors, in most estimated versions of the exit 
model market concentration positively affects the probability of exiting although the coefficient is 
insignificant. 
 
The estimates for the sub-sample of domestically-owned firms only (Appendix 1) confirm practically 
all the above derived conclusions from the full sample estimations. Further, it seems that the impact of 
FDI-related variables is even more pronounced and significant. The analysis of any difference between 
foreign and domestic firms with respect to the response to increased foreign firm activity follows.  
 
 
5.1. Correcting for endogeneity 
 
In all estimated versions of the exit model reported in Table 5, the coefficient of the fdiijt dummy 
variable is positive but not significant so it cannot be concluded that foreign firms differ with respect 
to the exit probability from domestically-owned competitors after controlling for other determinants of 
the exit decision. However, as already pointed out in the previous section, foreign ownership might not 
be entirely exogenous  particularly where foreign investors tend to acquire shares in the most 
successful, larger domestic firms. To deal with the problem of endogeneity, I instrument for the 
foreign ownership variable and estimate the instrumental variables probit by employing the two-stage 
method proposed by Newey (1987). I estimate three versions of the instrumental variables probit, and 
report the results in Table 6; in the first two versions (columns 1 and 2) I instrument for foreign 
ownership without distinguishing between different types of foreign investment, while in the third 
(column 3) I instrument for foreign ownership separately for acquisition and greenfield-type foreign 
investments.  
 
   22
Table 6: Instrumental variables probit exit model estimates for the aggregate sample of foreign 
and domestic firms  
 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  1 2 3 
fdi
INS  0.914***  (4.49)  0.934***  (4.63)   
    fdi (acquisitions)
INS     0.710***    (3.71) 
    fdi (greenfield)
 INS      -0.175  (-0.41) 
MNEentry  3.371***  (2.47)  1.361  (0.82)  2.066  (1.2) 
MNEentry·dTFPlow    7.086***  (2.94)  5.307**  (2.1) 
dTFPlow    -0.159**  (-2.19)  -0.132*  (-1.78) 
entry  0.497  (0.72)  0.467  (0.67)  0.641  (0.88) 
hFDI  0.212  (0.76)  4.513**  (2.44)  5.187***  (2.68) 
hFDI·lnWage    -0.672***  (-2.52)  -0.787***  (-2.83) 
ReghFDI  -0.361  (-0.72)  -0.196  (-0.39)  -0.201  (-0.39) 
BackFDI  5.070**  (2.24)  4.978**  (2.16)  5.762**  (2.43) 
BackConc  -25.375  (-1.08)  -26.738  (-1.11)  -25.546 (-1.05) 
ForFDI  -5.676**  (-2.39)  -6.532***  (-2.71)  -6.256***  (-2.54) 
ForConc  -4.004  (-0.2)  0.198  (0.01)  -5.698  (-0.28) 
IMint  0.204  (0.88)  0.176  (0.68)  0.157  (0.6) 
Imint·COMPL    1.130  (1.56)  1.179  (1.59) 
COMPL    -0.106  (-0.5)  -0.082  (-0.38) 
plants  -0.108***  (-3.15)  -0.109***  (-3.16)  -0.116***  (-3.27) 
HHI  0.187  (0.7)  0.292  (1.07)  0.378  (1.39) 
dexport  -0.075 (-1.28)  -0.080  (-1.36)  -0.063  (-1.05) 
dexmajor  0.014  (0.15)  0.007  (0.08)  0.063  (0.65) 
dprofit  -0.460***  (-6.13)  -0.466***  (-6.19)  -0.445***  (-5.82) 
lnEmpl  -1.043***  (-13.16)  -1.052***  (-13.22)  -1.064***  (-13.21) 
lnEmpl2  0.071***  (3.45)  0.072***  (3.48)  0.074***  (3.55) 
lnTFP  -0.308***  (-5.47)  -0.349***  (-5.48)  -0.347***  (-5.39) 
lnKint  -0.251***  (-8.34)  -0.254*** (-8.4)  -0.257***  (-8.35) 
lnWage  -0.426***  (-8.18)  -0.371***  (-6.38)  -0.358  (-6.06) 
lnAge  -4.405***  (-9.19)  -4.453***  (-9.24)  -4.427***  (-9.07) 
lnAge2  2.956***  (19.73)  2.986***  (19.82)  2.998***  (19.56) 
Cons  10.272***  (4.62)  9.622*** (4.16)  8.719***  (3.59) 
Hausman-Wu test (Chi2(1))   23.845***    
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1959.327 -1946.924 -1899.125 
sectoral dummies   INCL INCL INCL 
time dummies  INCL INCL INCL 
regional dummies  INCL INCL INCL 
ownership type dummies  INCL INCL INCL 
N  30063 30006 30101 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses,  
-  
INS denotes instrumented, 
-  Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance, 
-  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
The intuition of the downward bias in the estimated coefficient of foreign ownership dummy in the 
previous estimates is confirmed. It appears that, when instrumented, foreign ownership significantly 
positively affects the probability of exiting (columns 1 and 2, Table 6), but this influence is not   23
uniform for the two different types of foreign investment. According to column 3 in the model, only 
foreign ownership in the form of an acquisition is associated with a greater probability of exiting 
compared to other firms, while there is no evidence of a significant impact for a greenfield investment. 
The endogeneity of the foreign ownership variable seems to be confirmed in our estimates from the 
aggregate sample as the Hausman-Wu test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity at a negligible 
risk. This finding is in line with those of Görg and Strobl (2003) and Bernard and Jensen (2002) who 
also confirm that foreign plants have higher hazards of exiting than indigenous plants. 
 
Turning to the estimated coefficients for the other variables, the IV probit results from Table 6 support 
previous estimates both with respect to the significance and relative magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients with the exception that in the IV probit estimates the positive impact of BackFDIjt on the 
probability of exiting and the negative impact of age becomes significant, while the influence of being 
a ‘majority’ exporter and the positive coefficient of the interaction term between import intensity and 
degree of import-foreign affiliates sales overlapping are no longer significant. The main difference 
thus appears to be with respect to the increased probability of exiting in response to the concentration 
of foreign firms in downstream industries which provides additional support for the presence of 
vertical crowding out taking place through backward linkages between foreign firms and their local 
suppliers. 
 
It has to be stressed that the IV probit’s results crucially depend on the appropriateness (exogeneity) 
and quality of instruments used in the first step of the estimator. Besides, there is another issue that 
needs to be taken into account, namely the possibility that various factors affect the probability of 
exiting of domestic and foreign firms differently. Since the IV approach assumes that coefficients on 
the X’s (independent variables) are restricted to be the same for foreign and domestic firms I also 
estimate Heckman’s maximum-likelihood probit selection correction model (endogenous switching 
regime model). I split the sample into foreign and domestic firms and then estimate the exit model for 
each sub-sample correcting for the fact that the sub-samples are non-random samples of all firms 
(Table 7).  
 
The estimates for the sub-sample of domestic firms (Table 7, column 1), corrected for selection bias 
which is according to Wald’s test significant at 1%, generally support previous estimates based on a 
heteroscedastic probit model for domestic firms only (Appendix 1) with respect to the significance and 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients. The exception is, similarly with the IV probit estimates (Table 
6), that the increased concentration of foreign firms in downstream industries significantly increases 
the probability of exiting and that the negative impact of age on the probability of exiting becomes 
significant. Further, the conclusion is confirmed from the basic estimates that a foreign firm’s entry in 
the form of an acquisition has a more significant crowding-out effect on domestic firms compared to 
greenfield investments . 
 
 
Table 7: Heckman’s selection correction exit model for foreign and domestic firms 
(Coef.)  Domestic firms   Domestic firms   Foreign firms 
  1   2   3 
MNEentry  2.029  (1.38)    -10.593  (-1.07) 
GREENentry    2.216  (1.12)   
ACQUISentry   3.843***    (2.68)  
MNEentry·dTFPlow  5.858***  (2.47)    -12.540  (-0.55) 
dTFPlow  -0.111  (-1.5)    -0.253  (-0.59) 
entry  0.564  (0.9)  0.612  (0.98)  3.512  (1.12) 
hFDI  3.295  (1.58)  0.180  (0.75)  -16.134  (-1.18)   24
hFDI·lnWage  -0.523*  (-1.68)    1.813  (0.96) 
ReghFDI  -0.128  (-0.27)  -0.179  (-0.41)  -2.970  (-1.03) 
BackFDI  5.944***  (2.69)  5.351***  (2.53)  5.775  (0.62) 
BackConc  -2.942  (-0.12)  6.642  (0.29)  -53.827  (-0.58) 
ForFDI  -7.580***  (-3.21)  -6.778***  (-2.97)  10.544  (0.82) 
ForConc  -8.988  (-0.45)  -14.890  (-0.76)  -30.526  (-0.36) 
IMint  0.082  (0.55)  0.123  (0.89)  -1.451  (-1.44) 
Imint·COMPL  1.284*  (1.88)    9.693**  (2.39) 
COMPL  0.015  (0.08)    -2.686**  (-2.29) 
plants  -0.102***  (-3.3)  -0.101***  (-3.33)  -4.584***  (-3.01) 
HHI  0.367  (1.5)  0.167  (0.69)  2.160  (1.56) 
dexport  -0.059  (-1.04)  -0.055  (-0.98)  -0.369  (-1.11) 
dexmajor  0.149*  (1.78)  0.142*  (1.72)  1.016*** (2.9) 
dprofit  -0.435*** (-5.25)  -0.444***  (-5.38)  -2.126***  (-4.51) 
lnEmpl  -0.939*** (-7.09)  -0.941***  (-7.21)  -1.392***  (-3.19) 
lnEmpl2  0.044  (1.31)  0.047  (1.43)  0.097  (1.08) 
lnTFP  -0.285***  (-3.62)  -0.261***  (-3.83)  -1.118***  (-3) 
lnKint  -0.277***  (-8.98)  -0.267***  (-8.74)  -0.463***  (-2.77) 
lnWage  -0.411***  (-5.81)  -0.456***  (-7.18)  -0.302  (-0.79) 
lnAge  -4.392***  (-8)  -4.302***  (-8)  -11.956***  (-4.51) 
lnAge2  2.961***  (15.06)  2.907***  (15.18)  6.323***  (5.53) 
Cons  6.883***  (3.45)  6.963***  (3.61)  -8.971  (-0.72) 
1. STAGE SELECTION   domestic domestic  fdi 
domesticlag/fdilag  4.005***  (47.49)  4.006***  (47.49)  4.003***  (47.87) 
lnEmpllag  -0.085***  (-5.5)  -0.085***  (-5.49)  0.094***  (5.65) 
lnAgelag  0.579***  (6.02)  0.581***  (6.04)  -0.685***  (-7.44) 
lnAge2lag  -0.116***  (-3.55)  -0.116***  (-3.56)  0.148***  (4.51) 
profitsaleslag  -0.013***  (-3.41)  -0.013***  (-3.41)  0.013***  (3.98) 
Exproplag  -0.708***  (-9.06)  -0.707***  (-9.07)  0.690***  (8.76) 
lnTFPlag  0.356***  (7.11)  0.356***  (7.13)  -0.390***  (-8.24) 
lnWagelag  -0.106***  (-14.37)  -0.106***  (-14.36)  0.102***  (13.6) 
cons  -3.064***  (-13.05)  -3.068***  (-13.09)  -0.727***  (-3.6) 
Wald’s test of independent equations (H0: rho=0) 
Athrho   0.299*** (2.72)  0.285*** (2.67)  0.110 (0.35) 
rho  0.291 0.277 0.110 
chi2(1)  (Prob>chi2)  7.4***  (0.006)  7.100***  (0.008)  0.100  (0.728) 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -3453.9 -3479.360  -1593.621 
industry dummies   INCL INCL INCL 
time dummies  INCL INCL INCL 
N (uncensored)  30412 (28524)  30590 (28702)  31271  (1866) 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses, Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance, ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations 
 
The results for the foreign firm sub-sample corrected for selection bias
11 suggest that some factors 
considered in the model affect the probability of foreign firms exiting differently than in the case of 
domestic firms. It appears that the average wage has a insignificant impact on the probability of 
foreign firms exiting which is probably due to the greater multicollinearity of this variable with total 
factor productivity compared to the domestic firm sub-sample, while the impact of other firm 
characteristics is similar as for domestic firms; that is size, age, total factor productivity, capital 
                                                 
11 According to Wald’s test, the independence of the exit and selection equation cannot be rejected.   25
intensity, profitability and number of subsidiaries negatively affect the probability of exiting and there 
is evidence of non-linear effects only for the age variable. Regarding the crowding-out effect and 
spillovers from the entry and presence of other foreign firms, there is no evidence of either crowding-
out or spillover effects from foreign firms to other foreign firms. On the other hand, the intuition for 
the crowding-out effect of imports is similar as in the case of domestic firms but with a higher 
responsiveness to the degree of complementarity between imports and foreign firm sales.  
 
The selection equation in the first stage of Heckman’s probit selection correction model (Table 7, 
column 3) indicates that MNEs tend to acquire shares in domestic firms that are larger, younger, have 
a higher export propensity and a higher ratio of profits to sales, and are more skill-intensive (pay 
higher average wages), while the incidence of being acquired by a foreign investor is negatively 
related to total factor productivity. Thus, our hypothesis that foreign owners invest in more efficient 
local firms is not entirely confirmed. These conclusions are partially in line with previous studies on 
the determinants of FDI selection for a sample of Slovenian manufacturing firms. Damijan et al. 
(2003) found for a sample of firms with more than 10 employees that the probability of a foreign 
investment decision is positively related to the skill intensity of a firm, while capital intensity, labour 
productivity and size have an insignificant effect. 
 
Based on the IV probit’s estimates, conclusions from the basic heteroscedastic probit estimates about 
the impact of foreign firms’ entry and presence on the probability of exiting of local (domestic) firms 
seem to be robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of the foreign ownership variable. 
Further, there is additional evidence that the concentration of foreign firms in downstream industries 
(through backward linkages) has a negative net impact on the probability of surviving for domestic 
firms.  
 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In the paper I test several theoretical predictions on inward FDI’s impacts on a domestic firm’s exit 
decision. I estimate different empirical specifications of the exit probit model using annual panel data 
on Slovenian manufacturing firms for the 1994-2003 period and controlling for several of the 
econometric problems involved.  
 
The theoretically predicted channels through which inward FDI affects firm selection processes in a 
host country prove to be mostly significant for the Slovenian manufacturing sector in the last decade. 
First, there is evidence of the direct impact of foreign firms on a change in the population of firms in 
Slovenia’s manufacturing sector. Not only do foreign entrants tend to be above-average productive but 
they also differ from their domestic rivals with respect to the ease of exit. Foreign-owned firms find it 
easier to exit (particularly those entering in the form of acquisitions), confirming that they are on 
average more mobile than their domestic counterparts.  
 
Second, the entry of foreign firms stimulates the selection process and reallocation of resources among 
firms within the same industry based on their productive efficiency. The firm selection process is, 
namely, characterised by the least efficient firms experiencing a drop in their survival probability upon 
a foreign firm’s entry. More specifically, I find that if the foreign firm entry rate increases by one 
structural point the exit probability increases on average by 8.7%, while for the least efficient firms the 
exit probability rises by almost 24%. On the other hand, more efficient and more skill-intensive firms 
do not experience any pronounced ‘static’ crowding out with respect to the increased probability to 
exit. In addition, a foreign firm’s entry seems to stimulate the selection process not only within the   26
industry but also through backward linkages in the upstream supplying industries as indicated by less 
skill-intensive firms’ increased probability of exiting when the concentration of foreign firm activity in 
backwardly-linked industries increases.  
 
Third, regarding the productivity spillover effects from foreign to local firms the results suggest that 
they mostly operate through vertical linkages rather than within the same industry. The positive impact 
of foreign firms’ activity on the survival probability through forward linkages with local customers is 
the most pronounced, while there is a higher probability of local firms exiting that is associated with 
the concentration of foreign firms in backwardly-linked industries. In general, it seems that not all 
firms are able to equally benefit from a foreign firm’s presence and that their absorptive capacity plays 
an important role. 
   27
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Appendix 1: Heteroscedastic probit exit model estimates for the sub-sample 
of domestic firms  
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(0.75)  0.0054 
ACQUISentry        2.788** 
(2.4)  0.0121  2.776** 
(2.42)  0.0120 
MNEentry· 
    dTFPlow 
   5.218*** 
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(-0.2)  -0.0004  -0.084 
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Appendix 2: Random effects probit estimates of exit model for the sub-
sample of domestic firms in Slovenian manufacturing sector, 1994-2003 
 
  Coefficients 
MNEentry  0.922 (0.62) 
MNEentry· dTFPlow  6.061*** (2.75) 
dTFPlow  -0.137** (-2.16) 
entry  0.184 (0.31) 
hFDI  2.843** (2) 
hFDI· lnWage  -0.448**(-2.16) 
ReghFDI  0.457 (1.07) 
BackFDI  1.848 (0.92) 
BackConc  -13.734 (-0.66) 
ForFDI  -4.096** (-1.96) 
ForConc  5.707 (0.31) 
IMint  0.053 (0.24) 
Imint·COMPL  1.403** (2.16) 
COMPL  -0.216 (-1.19) 
plants  -0.109*** (-3.57) 
HHI  0.289 (1.23)   31
dexport  -0.016 (-0.31) 
dexmajor  0.172** (2.13) 
dprofit  -0.379*** (-5.48) 
lnEmpl  -0.841*** (-12.99) 
lnEmpl2  0.024 (1.35) 
lnTFP  -0.282*** (-4.89) 
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Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 
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